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China's reform of intergovernmental fiscal relations  
in the light of European experiences 
by Paul Bernd Spahn 
1. Introduction 
In October 1992, the 14th Congress of the Communist Party of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China embarked on the course toward creating a social-
ist market economy. The 8th National People’s adopted a revised Consti-
tution in 1993, and significant economic and fiscal reforms were subse-
quently introduced.  
A substantial part of the fiscal reforms was undertaken in the area of 
taxation. In view of a modern tax system conducive to the growth of the 
socialist market economy, various tax laws were unified and streamlined, 
and a value-added tax, excise taxes, and a business tax were inaugu-
rated that conform to international rules. In addition, the income tax was 
reformed which merged the pre-existing three tax laws into one using a 
standard approach for the derivation of income. Income is taxed pro-
gressively, and the income tax law features itemized deductions in order 
to pursue horizontal equity. The fiscal reforms go hand in hand with the 
liberalization of the pricing system, with a rephrasing of rules that gov-
ern business investment (in particular foreign investment), and with re-
forms in the financial sector and in foreign exchange regulations. 
As to further reforms in the fiscal area, intergovernmental fiscal relations 
are undergoing critical review, and basic principles for creating a fair 
system of burden sharing within the public sector are being discussed. 
Specifically, the reforms are expected to help promoting initiatives of 
both the central and regional governments, and to enhance the capacity 
of the central government to manage the economy at the macro level. 
The authorities are eager to develop a scientifically-based, non-
distortionary system of transfers among government in order to "meet 
legitimate expenditure needs of the provinces, and to ensure sustainable 
growth in a way that is commensurate with increased own-tax collection 
efforts by the provinces" (Ahmad/Craig/Searle 1994, p. 33). As a con-
crete measure, the State Council has introduced, on the 1st of January 
1994, a tax sharing system in combination with the dismantling of the 
previously employed "contracting system" whereby transfers among gov-
ernments were effected on the basis of negotiations. Furthermore, taxes 
are now more clearly assigned to different levels of government. How-
ever, some problems relating to a vertical fiscal imbalance between the 
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tiers of government remain, and the crucial problem of how to deal with 
fiscal perequation or equalization between regions is unresolved. 
At this important crossroad to the future of Chinese intergovernmental 
fiscal relations, it is appropriate and useful to study the various other 
models of organizing fiscal relations within the existing federations of 
the world. Apart from the Anglo-Saxon models of multilayer govern-
ment, Australia, Canada and the United States with their greatly varying 
solutions for intergovernmental financial relations, the European variants 
of federalism may also be of interest to the Chinese authorities, in par-
ticular since they rely more heavily on tax sharing and follow principles 
that are similar to those of the socialist market economy:  homogeneity 
of national standards and similarity, in due account of different local 
conditions, of public services with the aim of realizing the equality of 
chances for citizens (if not the equality of outcome). 
The European Union herself is moving toward a federal structure with 
nation states forming her different provinces, and more and more re-
sponsibilities beings transferred to a nucleus "central government" (the 
Council and its administration, the Commission). Yet Europeans agree 
that priority is given to decentralized responsibilities and decision mak-
ing in order to preserve the cultural diversity of the continent, and 
equalization among regions is mainly left to the market. Public policy at 
the central level is confined to preserving "cohesion" which is a much 
looser concept entailing only small-scale regional redistribution or pub-
lic resources. It is obvious that this approach to federalism is inappropri-
ate for China with its strong commitment to socialist values and to the 
equality of chances.  
On the other hand, Austria, Germany and Switzerland are European ex-
amples of federations at national levels. All are committed to concepts of 
regional fairness, and all employ revenue sharing as one mean to achieve 
greater harmony among the different regions of the nation. If we speak 
of "European federalism" in this paper, it is with reference to these na-
tional models rather than the supranational organization of the European 
Union herself. 
The present paper dwells on the experiences of Switzerland and Ger-
many while disregarding the Austrian model that lies somewhere in be-
tween the two models discussed. Germany has a very strong commit-
ment to the uniformity of living conditions within the nation, and tax 
sharing as well as specific perequation rules are used to achieve this 
goal. The Swiss Constitution is more heavily influenced by the United 
States' model and, hence, more decentralized. However strong reliance 
on consensus forming within the public sector corresponds with Chinese 
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traditions, and the desire to protect regionally dispersed minority groups 
very much reflect China's problems en miniature. Both models, Swiss and 
German federalism, can be said to have achieved their goals of regional 
fairness in harmony with economic growth and general welfare of their 
nations.  
In a last part of the paper, the author comments -- in a tentative and 
preliminary fashion -- from a European perspective on the Chinese op-
tions for reorganizing their intergovernmental fiscal relations. It is obvi-
ous that this perspective is limited as there are multiple other options for 
organizing the public sector. China will ultimately have to decide on its 
own whatever approach suits best to a socialist market economy. It is 
hoped that the information provided in this paper will be useful in mak-
ing this choice. 
2. The Swiss experience 
2.1. General 
Switzerland is a land-locked country composed of 26 cantons (and half-
cantons) of unequal size, topography and economic potentials. Its popu-
lation exhibits great variety as to cultural background, language, relig-
ion, settlement characteristics, and economic activities. While some re-
gions at the crossroads between Italy, France and Germany have bene-
fited from international trade for centuries, others remained more se-
cluded facing unfavorable mountainous conditions and geographical 
isolation. This explains large regional disparities and imbalances within 
the Swiss economy. In recent times, some formerly remote areas have 
experienced dramatic change to their economies due to transalpine traf-
fic and tourism, with a notable impact on the ecology. Swiss attitudes are 
thus characterized by the protection of minority groups, the preservation 
of cultural diversity, mutual consideration and assistance, and the care 
for the environment--which has constitutional rank. Such attitudes have 
also shaped institutional political arrangements. 
Of all the federations in the world Switzerland has by far the oldest tra-
dition dating back to the famous Everlasting Alliance of 1291 when three 
cantons formed a union to resist Habsburg rule. In 1815, the Congress 
of Vienna confirmed Switzerland’s independent political status and the 
Swiss Confederation was constituted in its present boundaries. In 1848 a 
formal federal Constitution was adopted for Switzerland that had con-
sisted of a loose confederacy of regions until then. The present ar-
rangements are based on this first Constitution that was, however, 
amended several times thence, notably through the important overhaul 
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of 1874, which was strongly influenced by the United States' model of 
federalism. 
2.2. Structure of government 
The basic elements of Swiss federalism are the following: 
• The cantons1 are legally sovereign states unless their sovereignty is 
explicitly limited by the Constitution. Likewise, municipalities have 
considerable legal autonomy and political power although not being 
fully sovereign. 
• The Confederation is based on the idea of equality between its con-
stituents, the cantons, which is reflected in the role of the Council of 
States, the Upper House of Parliament. Its voting procedure accords 
equal weight to each canton, big or small.2 
• The Constitution provides for a vertical distribution of responsibilities 
among layers of government, yet, as in Germany, lower tiers of gov-
ernment also perform functions that are delegated from above. Thus a 
neat vertical distribution of functions among authorities is difficult to 
discern. There are also elements of cooperative federalism -- hori-
zontal cooperation, through ministerial conferences, and expert-
based discussions and consulting procedures (Vernehmlassungs-
verfahren) whereby government agencies of different levels, political 
parties, and economic and social groups are involved in preparing leg-
islation. Formal collective decision-making bodies are lacking, how-
ever. 
• Revenue as well as expenditure functions are distributed independ-
ently among the tiers of government. Each authority has its own 
budget, yet budgets are interrelated through a network of intergov-
ernmental transfers. 
• Constraints are imposed on both expenditures and revenues by the 
political system of "direct democracy". Voters are not only asked to 
elect representatives; they are frequently called to the polls to decide 
                                       
1 There are 23 cantons three of which are divided into half-cantons. In addition 
there is a municipal substructure of about 3000 communes that act under cantonal 
control. As in Germany--and contrary to Australia--this layer of government is very 
important in Switzerland. Since the cantons may delegate government functions to their 
communities at extremely varying degrees it is best to treat the state level in Switzer-
land inclusive of communal services (and revenues). 
2 Each of the 20 full cantons has two representatives in the Council of States; the 
six half-cantons send one representative each. 
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on all proposed constitutional changes and on specific pieces of legis-
lation (including projects to amend federal tax financing). Federal ref-
erenda must not only be approved by a majority of voters, but also by 
a majority of the cantons. 
• Regional diversity in combination with cantonal sovereignty and direct 
democracy have led to different levels in the provision of regional 
public goods and to a variety in regional tax laws.3 The communes--
which have no independent tax sovereignty--may levy surcharges on 
cantonal taxes with varying annual coefficients.  
The Swiss model of federalism is complex not only because of the com-
plicated network of intergovernmental relations; it also interacts with the 
system of semi-direct democracy and proportional representation of 
parties which aims at maintaining close links between authorities and 
citizen-voters. Such arrangements reflect the importance accorded to 
the protection of minorities, and they entail specific forms of constitu-
tional and legislative procedures (see below).  
2.3. Current arrangements 
a. Expenditure assignment 
The Constitution attributes, to each layer of government, so-called 
"principal responsibilities". Article 49 of the Constitution empowers the 
Confederation to deal with foreign affairs, yet cantons are also allowed 
to enter into international agreements "on matters of neighborly rela-
tions".  
                                       
3 For income tax, for instance, where sovereignty is shared by the Confederation 
and the cantons, there are 26 + 1 different tax codes with varying definitions for tax 
bases, for exemptions and deductible items, as well as for tax rates. 
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Table 1: The structure of government budgets in Switzerland 
- 1993 - 
 Confederation Cantons Communes Total*) 
In percent of consolidated total 
Outlays 37.5  48.5  35.0  100.0  
Revenues 33.1  44.6  32.8  90.5  
Deficit 4.4  4.0  2.3  9.5  
In percent of GDP 
Outlays 11.6  15.0  10.8  30.9 
Revenues 10.2  13.8  10.1  28.0 
Deficit 1.4  1.2  0.7  2.9 
*) Single items do not add up due to the elimination of double counting 
for the total. Budgeted figures may not coincide with financial accounts.  
Source: Eidgenössische Finanzverwaltung, Öffentliche Finanzen der 
Schweiz 1993; own calculations. 
 
The exclusive responsibilities of the Confederation are in defense, citi-
zenship and the status of foreigners, political asylum, civil and penal 
law, social protection, policies on property, economic order, money and 
currency, energy policy, national transportation and telecommunication 
(Article 50). Exclusive competences of cantons are in the maintenance of 
public order, public welfare, establishments of health care, schools and 
education, the relationship between state and church, regional and local 
land planning, highways as well as the use of water and other resources 
(Article 51). For all further domains--the Constitutions mentions in par-
ticular health, the protection of the environment, culture, the fostering of 
research, science and arts, universities and vocational education--there 
is a presumption in favor of canton responsibility unless federal law as-
signs functions otherwise. 
This division of responsibilities is, however, not easily discernible from 
the budget or financial accounts and certainly not fully reflected in the 
structure of government expenditures. As in the case of Germany, coop-
eration among authorities and the delegation of executive functions to 
lower levels of government---in combination with intergovernmental 
transfers of resources--render it difficult to assess the political signifi-
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cance of public authority from the vertical breakdown of public outlays 
as shown in Table 1.4 
The extensive network of payments, subsidies, incentives, joint financing 
and delegation of competences that has evolved over the years tends to 
dissolve authentic public spending authorities and to blur accountability. 
Such complexities may also have contributed to hoisting particular pri-
vate interests over national or regional policy objectives in some in-
stances (Bieri 1979, 48).  
b. Tax assignment 
The Swiss constitution is very explicit in separating taxing powers verti-
cally. Originally, the center government collected all the indirect taxes 
(customs duties and excises); cantonal and municipal governments were 
ascribed direct taxes (income and wealth taxes). Over the years, the 
Confederation has, however, acquired powers in the realm of income 
taxation as well. This was mainly dictated by vertical fiscal imbalances 
and diverging revenue needs--not by stabilization policies. In the Swiss 
case, the federal income tax was introduced during World War I--in the 
disguise of a "defense tax". World War II has seen the introduction of yet 
another important federal tax, the turnover tax (a wholesale sales tax). 
Both "emergency taxes" stayed on, and their introduction was later sanc-
tioned by a constitutional amendment. However, the law fixes maximum 
rates for these federal taxes, and "sunset" dates were established for 
their expiring.5 
As to present arrangements, the following vertical assignment of taxes is 
found in Switzerland: 
• Indirect taxation on expenditures, excises and customs duties are ex-
clusively federal. 
                                       
4 The sum of outlays of each level of government exceeded the consolidated total 
by more than 20 percent in 1993. 
5 The constitutional basis for the Confederation's direct tax and turnover tax ends 
in 1994. A proposal for a tax reform securing revenue for the Confederation was re-
jected in 1991, forcing the government to embark on an "emergency program" and, 
later, on a fourth referendum on introducing VAT in Switzerland. This referendum was 
finally accepted in November 1993 granting the adoption of VAT at the beginning of 
1995. Again, a "sunset" date was established (the year 2006), and the vote, once again, 
limits the rate by the Constitution, at 6.5 percent significantly lower than in neighbor-
ing countries and well below the minimum rate established for members of the Euro-
pean Union (15 percent). 
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• Tax bases of direct taxes on personal income and wealth, and on 
business income and wealth are exploited concurrently by all levels of 
government, including municipalities--with priority given to the can-
tons.6 
• As a matter of principle "(e)ach tier of government is endowed with a 
full or partial tax authority for a number of taxes and not only one. 
Cantons and communes have also the right to levy user charges and 
fees for those services where this is appropriate" (Dafflon 1991) 
• The cantons have an exclusive right to tax motor vehicles. 
As to the contribution of taxes and grants to total revenue at each level 
of government, Table 2 (for 1988) may serve to illustrate its structure.  
 
Table 2: Sources of revenue  
for each level of government in Switzerland 
- in percent - 
Revenue source Confederation Cantons Communes 
Taxes on income  
and wealth 
41 50 50 
Taxes on consumption 
and expenditures 
52 3 - 
Monopolies, license, 
revenue from property 
4 5 6 
Total own source  
revenue 
97 59 57 
Grants-in-aid and 
reimbursements 
- 21 15 
Revenue sharing - 6 2 
Indemnities and sales 3 14 26 
Total revenue 100 100 100 
Source: Dafflon (1991). 
 
The bestowal of independent taxing powers to each layer of responsibil-
ity enables the federal as well as regional governments to discharge their 
functions effectively without being dependent on each other. Contrary to 
                                       
6 There is opposition against the federal government exploiting direct taxes, how-
ever, and a conforming constitutional initiative was lodged in November 1993. 
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Australia, for instance, cantonal dependence on grants is low in Switzer-
land. It amounts to an average of 21 per cent of their budgets. If revenue 
sharing is included, it is only 27 per cent. It should be noted, however, 
that the figure for grants comprises 7½ per cent of municipal contribu-
tions to cantonal services--hence upward-oriented vertical grants. If 
these grants are deducted, the total dependency of cantons on the Con-
federation is below 20 per cent of their budget receipts. Competing tax-
ing powers at the two levels of government and diversity in fiscal federal 
arrangements create enormous problems of tax coordination, tax com-
petition and harmonization in Switzerland (Dafflon 1986). Although the 
Constitution mandates the avoidance of cantonal double-taxation, legis-
lation was slow to respond and the Courts of Justice largely developed 
the principles governing horizontal tax coordination. The variety and 
complexity of subnational tax systems is only rivaled by that of the 
United States where tax competition as well as vertical and horizontal tax 
coordination has been a major concern for years. In Switzerland, case 
law has, however, established a uniform practice as regards the question 
which canton is allowed to tax which part of the income of individuals 
and companies.7 Some of the constitutional provisions attempting to 
cope with intercantonal double taxation or prohibiting special taxation of 
industries (Articles 46 (2) and 31 of the Swiss Constitution) evoke con-
forming instruments embodied in the United States' federal arrange-
ments (like the "immunity doctrine" or the "due process of law clause" of 
the Fifth Amendment). 
c. Equalization, revenue sharing, and grants 
There is a strong tendency in Switzerland to equalize differences in tax-
able capacity through asymmetrical vertical grants provided by the cen-
tral government. The objective is to enable the cantons to provide simi-
lar levels of services without forcing them to levy taxes that are signifi-
cantly more onerous than in other cantons. This prescript is firmly en-
trenched in the federal law on equalization of 1959. The principle of 
"uniformity of living conditions"--typical for German equalization ar-
rangements--is not adhered to in Switzerland, however (Bieri 1979, 12). 
The redistributive aims are mainly achieved through three types of verti-
cal financial adjustments: 
• federal tax reimbursements;  
• tax sharing; and 
                                       
7 For a further discussion see, for instance, Dafflon (1977), pp. 88ff. 
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• specific purpose grants (usually conditional grants-in-aid). 
Similarly to Australia at the inception of the federation, the Swiss Con-
federation reimburses part of the revenues collected from customs du-
ties (yet only on fuel and petrol). This reflects the fact that the Confed-
eration has delegated certain responsibilities (especially road building) to 
the cantons to be administered by them on behalf of the central gov-
ernment. The horizontal incidence of these payments is very complex 
since they are mainly related to cantonal expenditures on road construc-
tion and improvement. Although financial assistance is calculated in ac-
cordance with these functions--and on a fiscal capacity yardstick to be 
discussed below8--, these transfers are essentially unconditional. 
Tax sharing is often portrayed in Switzerland as a mean to compensate 
the cantons for their tax sovereignties forgone as these were transferred 
to the Confederation (Higy 1973, 8). Such means--that have recently be-
come more important under pressure from cantonal governments--can 
also be interpreted to form unconditional general revenue grants. They 
are basically distributed in accordance with regional revenue collection, 
population and with the canton's relative fiscal "needs"--measured in 
terms of a statistical yardstick. Tax-sharing revenues thus form part of 
an asymmetrical vertical perequation scheme that is closed-ended.  
The scheme can be imagined to work in two steps: (i) the federal contri-
bution may be thought of constituting a "closed pool"; (ii) horizontal 
perequation is then achieved through rules similar to those of German 
Finanzausgleich.9 
In 1992, tax sharing encompassed three revenue sources. The cantons 
received 30 per cent of the federal direct tax on income and profits, 10 
percent of the withholding tax, and 20 per cent of a tax on exemption 
                                       
8 The formula apportions 34 per cent of the grant according to cantonal expendi-
tures on roads, 12 per cent according to the length of roads, 43 per cent according to 
equalization yardstick (see below) and the rest in accordance with the canton's relative 
tax effort regarding the motor vehicle tax and its relative per capita expenditures on 
roads (Dafflon 1991). 
9 The federal government's contribution to such a "pool" was zero in Germany be-
fore unification, hence the "pool" must be filled through contributions made by the 
richer states. As to its impact on horizontal fiscal incidence the Swiss model is, how-
ever, rather similar to that of German Finanzausgleich. In particular, if a cantons fiscal 
capacity falls, the compensating fiscal effect of the revenue-sharing grant is made-up 
by other cantons, not by the Confederation. 
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from military service.10 The latter tax share is distributed horizontally on 
a tax origin base--without equalization provisions. The direct tax share 
is allocated partly on a tax origin base, partly according to the fiscal ca-
pacity yardstick discussed below. Revenue sharing from the withholding 
tax is allocated to the cantons according to population for one half, ac-
cording to fiscal capacity for the other. 
Traditionally, vertical intergovernmental transfers have been dominated 
by conditional grants-in-aid to be applied in accordance with policy pri-
orities of the donor government. Conditional grants given to cantons by 
the Confederation are usually closed-ended with strings attached in the 
form of matching requirements. Some grants are provided with "pass-
through" obligations, i.e. they have to be handed down to municipalities, 
sometimes together with mandatory additional funding of the canton.  
In addition to providing funds for specific state functions according to 
national priorities, federal conditional grants are also intended to have 
some equalizing effect. As for tax reimbursement grants and for tax 
sharing, their horizontal allocation is partly based on a cantonal fiscal 
capacity measure.  
d. Fiscal capacity and equalization 
Measurement of the cantons' fiscal capacity has been modified several 
times. The actual formula comprises four ingredients (Dafflon 1991):  
• The canton's (adjusted) fiscal revenue per capita. This includes canto-
nal and local tax revenue from all sources (adjusted for differences in 
tax effort in order to obtain comparable figures). 
• The canton's GDP per capita. Not only fiscal resources are stressed in 
the formula, but also private income (which seems to be a natural in-
dicator of fiscal capacity); this is different from Germany or Australia 
where only public revenue is considered in the formulae for horizontal 
perequation. 
• Regional (cantonal and local) tax effort. In a federation that accords a 
large degree of tax discretion to regional governments, no canton can 
                                       
10 Male Swiss citizens exempted from military service pay this tax. It is essentially a 
"poll tax" that is proportional to income and inversely related to the days of military 
service accomplished. 
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be allowed to benefit from higher grants by reducing its own fiscal ef-
fort below an acceptable level.11 
• The canton's specific expenditure requirements. These enter the for-
mula in a rather modest way--similar to expenditure needs in German 
Finanzausgleich. Differences in the costs of providing services in 
mountainous regions are expressed by an indicator measuring the 
relative importance of agricultural areas below 800 meters; another 
proxy for differences in costs is relative population density. These in-
dicators may appear to be extremely crude in comparison to the crite-
ria developed by the Commonwealth Grants Commission in Australia. 
Despite these provisions for horizontal perequation through asymmetri-
cal vertical revenue sharing and grants, equalization is generally less im-
portant in Switzerland than in other Western federation--except the 
United States. The main outcome was to increase the amount of subsi-
dies given to poorer cantons, a virtually self-perpetuating category (Frey 
1977, 98-100). As one prominent writer on Swiss federalism has con-
cluded: "... equalization in grant programs is of subsidiary interest only" 
in Switzerland (Dafflon 1989, 213). 
e. Borrowing 
In principle each public constituency is autonomous and independent in 
its budgetary procedures in Switzerland, including borrowing. Yet this 
does not mean that there is no effective budget constraint on deficit 
spending. The idea of "sound financing" of public budgets is firmly en-
trenched in people's minds, and this consensus view governs fiscal fed-
eral arrangements in general. Moreover, direct democracy has secured 
that law prohibits soft financing through money creation, and obligatory 
finance referenda--or the mere threat of calling to the polls in the case 
of facultative referenda--act as an effective constraint on loan finance--
as it does on taxation. The "golden rule" is formally established which 
permits borrowing only for investment purposes on a pay-as-you-use 
basis. Article 42bis of the Constitution obliges the federal government to 
consolidate budget deficits with due "consideration for the state of the 
economy". At the local level, law in most cantons limits borrowing. It is 
restricted to balancing current budgets (including interest payments and 
amortization of the debt), and the "golden rule" is also brought to bear. 
                                       
11 A similar correction is made for horizontal perequation through special grants in 
Australia. In Germany--with its uniformity in taxation--such a criterion is not applied 
(and would not make much sense). 
Spahn, Paul Bernd (1995), ”China’s Reform of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in the Light 
of European Experiences”, in Jayanta Roy (ed.), Macroeconomic Management and Fiscal 
Decentralization, EDI Seminar Series, The World Bank, Washington D.C., 125-162.  
13 
According to the Constitution, cantonal laws or municipal decrees, the 
following can be subject to referenda: "engagement credits or project 
appropriations, the estimates (of the budget) as a whole, individual pay-
ment credits or annual appropriations, or loans" (Bieri 1979, 70). Despite 
the fact that the importance of finance referenda has declined, the even-
tuality of such referenda and a broad consensus on the issue seems to 
have worked, in the past, as an effective constraint on public borrowing. 
During the eighties, Swiss governments produced even small financial 
surpluses. More recently, however, public budgets started to drift into 
deficits that are estimated to have reached some 5 percent of GDP in 
1993.12 This is attributable both to cyclical and structural problems af-
fecting the Swiss constituency. 
2.4. Administrative structure 
a. Tax administration 
As in Germany, the administration of taxes is highly decentralized in 
Switzerland. Each layer of government administers its own taxes, with 
some compensation for administrative costs incurred for shared taxes. 
This reflects independent taxing autonomy of subcentral governments 
and the multiplicity of cantonal tax laws that have sprung from it. Unlike 
in Germany, tax administration is not necessarily guided by uniform 
rules and procedures as tax legislation for one and the same tax might 
differ significantly among regions. The assessment of multi-cantonal 
companies is a burdensome task both for the private sector as for tax 
administrators, since the rules to avoid double taxation among regions 
have become rather complex over the years. Significant cooperation and 
exchange of information among fiscs is required rendering the process 
of tax assessment and verification very cumbersome. The notion of "tax 
jungle" is often used in connection with Swiss taxation and its adminis-
trative intricacies.  
Attempts made in Switzerland in the mid-seventies to introduce a uni-
form federal income tax with cantonal participation, or to impose uni-
form cantonal direct taxes throughout the nation were both defeated. 
Following a constitutional amendment in 1977, the Confederation has 
chosen the avenue of some formal tax harmonization of income taxes, 
and, more recently, harmonization of direct cantonal and communal 
taxation was successful to some extent--following conforming legisla-
                                       
12 Gygi (1994). This figure is higher than the budget figure of Table 1. The effective 
deficit of the federal government alone is expected to exceed the budgeted figure by 
about 5 bill. francs (or 1½ percent of GDP). Witschard (1994, 38). 
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tion.13 Furthermore, a referendum on the introduction of VAT held in No-
vember 1993 was positive. This illustrates both the Swiss electorate’s 
willingness to accept basic reforms and a mounting disposition toward 
centralization and harmonization. Such change might also have been 
spurred by developments in neighboring countries, notably in the Euro-
pean Union, as well as by recent tendencies in world capital markets and 
international tax competition. 
b.  Budget formulation and implementation 
Budgetary procedures in Switzerland differ significantly from those ex-
isting in other countries. Items to be included in the budget must have 
been decided upon beforehand, and budget appropriations cannot be 
introduced in their own right. In other words, "public budgets are not 
material financial laws enacted by Parliament, but only documents or 
formal laws that are established by the government and discussed by 
Parliament. The power of the Legislature to decide priorities and the 
amounts of public outlays is limited." (Dafflon 1977, 72).  
The budget and medium-term financial planning--a planning tool of the 
Federal Council--serve mainly to establish a coherent view on public fi-
nances and on its macroeconomic impact. Its classification is by gov-
ernment function and types of expenditure as well as economic catego-
ries and modes of financing. The budget is established both on a cash-
flow and an accrual basis, and it also allows monitoring government 
commitments. 
The peculiarity of Swiss public budgeting shifts political responsibilities 
onto legislative and constitutional procedures rather than Parliament and 
the budget itself. It is through these procedures that direct democracy 
comes into play. Although legislation is normally initiated by Parliament, 
the Constitution allows the electorate to challenge any proposition by 
constitutional initiatives, and the demand must eventually be put to the 
nation in a referendum. Similarly, any cantonal government can compel 
the government to examine draft legislation by the Councils. 
Examination typically leads to the appointment of a Select Committee, 
which opens consultation with public authorities, political parties, special 
                                       
13 Loi fédérale du 14 décembre 1990 sur l'harmonisation des impôts directs des 
cantons et des communes. The cantons and communes are accorded eight years to 
adapt their respective legislation. After this term, federal rules will apply automatically. 
At the same time, the federal law on direct taxation has been coordinated. 
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interest groups and organizations (Vernehmlassungsverfahren).14 This 
process allows some particular interests to creep in, yet it also ensures 
legislation to be based on a broad social consensus.  
2.5. Macroeconomic Implications 
Traditional theory of federalism suggests that macroeconomic manage-
ment rests on a certain degree of centralizing government spending 
functions as well as on the power (and willingness) to use the budget as 
a fiscal policy instrument. In Switzerland, a highly decentralized public 
sector and complex budgeting procedures do not seem to be advanta-
geous for such a proposition, although the Constitution obliges the fed-
eral government to take provisions for balanced economic growth, and 
all tiers of government to consider macroeconomic aspects when estab-
lishing their budgets (Article 31quinquies). Also, built-in stabilizers are weak 
given a considerable time lag between the accrual of income and the 
collection of direct taxes. The gross turnover tax, which also taxes in-
vestment and intermediate inputs, is even procyclical, and Swiss taxation 
is sometimes characterized as an "automatic destabilizer" (OECD 1993, 
55). On the expenditure side, the government has also limited discre-
tion. During the eighties, when revenues were buoyant entailing small 
budget surpluses, expenditure policies were equally procyclical (Gygi 
1994, 16). The only significant self-acting stabilization effect derives 
from federal unemployment insurance that came into effect in 1984. 
Nevertheless, Switzerland has experienced remarkable fiscal stability 
over the post-war period, with relative price stability, full employment 
and a strong currency. Apart from monetary and wage policies, migra-
tion, transborder commuters and seasonal workers as well as fluctuating 
labor participation rates, especially before the introduction of federal 
unemployment insurance, seem to have cushioned cyclical shocks until 
more recently. However, unemployment--which stood at only half a per-
cent in 1990--has significantly risen thence (to about 4½ percent in 
mid-1993). This is mainly attributed the institutional change of unem-
ployment insurance and the behavior of labor supply (OECD 1993, 98), 
apart from a recession and structural difficulties of the Swiss economy. 
Recession and structural problems are also reflected in public budgets, 
which have deteriorated over the years. In the nineties, expenditure 
growth has strongly exceeded revenues forcing governments of all tiers 
into debt. The federal government has responded by submitting to Par-
                                       
14 For a further discussion of constitutional and legislative procedures in Switzer-
land see Laufenburger (1961) or a summary in Dafflon (1977, 72f.) 
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liament an extensive fiscal consolidation package, yet the very nature of 
the budgeting procedure renders its implementation difficult. The gov-
ernment is thus suggesting a constitutional amendment in order to limit 
parliamentary spending powers as they exceed the proposal of the Ex-
ecutive ("frein aux dépenses").  
The introduction of a modern broad-based consumption tax on goods 
and services in 1995 will strengthen the revenue side of the budget, as it 
will remove the procyclical conduct of the existing turnover tax. It will 
also abolish some of the structural handicaps of the old tax system that 
discriminates against investment and exports--besides impeding effec-
tive decentralization and contracting-out. Yet the VAT rate is limited by 
the Constitution, and the medium-term financial plan foresees a con-
tinuing and widening structural budget deficit for 1986-1997 (Gygi 
1994, 15). 
2.6. Conclusions 
If a lesson can be learned from the Swiss experience it is that "systems 
based on a strong reliance on cantonal sovereignty can work, even 
though it will likely result in wildly different--though widely accepted--
personal (and other) tax systems" (Bird 1986, 67). The picture of a "tax 
jungle" and lack of coordination is thus inappropriate. 
One feature of Swiss federalism is to be stressed in particular: an inher-
ent tendency toward consensus and compromise, and a strong commit-
ment to the securing of minority interests. Political decisions are seldom 
reached without prior consensus among all parties, and it would not be 
acceptable to decide on policy issues that are likely to meet resistance by 
substantial minority groups. Helvetian cooperative federalism means 
effective coordination at the horizontal level, and institutionalized 
vertical consulting among political parties, economic and social groups, 
and government bodies at all levels. Established coordinative bodies (as 
in Germany) are missing however. The Helvetian brand of "cooperative" 
federalism resembles more to Asian consensus forming and collective-
choice. In the past, this philosophy has brought about effective policy 
coordination within a highly diversified policy structure, as it has fos-
tered political and economic stability, growth and general welfare, with-
out much formal demand management.  
Yet the constitutional and legislative procedures have recently come un-
der strain mainly through the process of European integration and in-
creased competition on international markets. The need for structural 
reform of the Swiss economy is obvious, and it is likely to corroborate 
central government involvement. Yet government authority at all levels 
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remains subject to scrutiny by the Swiss electorate, and conservative 
trends have often impeded government action on issues sensitive to 
Switzerland's neighbors (like transalpine traffic). Thus, the Swiss model 
of political decision-making remains antagonistic to the approach taken 
by the European Union. It remains to be seen whether Helvetian federal-
ism can survive in an environment that calls for greater coordination at 
the supranational level, and whether the principle of subsidiarity is suffi-
cient to protect devolution of power and direct democracy in Switzer-
land. 
3. The German experience 
3.1. General 
A superficial glance at the German arrangements may detect many fea-
tures of a unitary state. There is a strong central government with an ex-
tensive area of influence; there is uniformity in legislation on almost all-
important issues; and there is a uniform tax system. For the provision of 
public goods, the German Constitution emphasizes uniformity of living 
conditions for the whole nation (rather than minimum standards), and a 
further peculiarity of German federalism is the strong coordination of 
policies among different layers of government. Sure, there are distinct 
elements that vindicate the official title of federation, the existence of 
intermediate levels of governments, sixteen Länder or states (after unifi-
cation), and a local government sector the importance of which cannot 
be over-emphasized. Yet the impression of a "unitary German federa-
tion" remains very strong.  
3.2. Structure of government 
The Constitution of 1949, the Grundgesetz, confers primary state pow-
ers to the states. However, the lower tier of government has since expe-
rienced a continuous erosion of its original competences in favor of the 
federal government. This is the consequence of legislation being concur-
rent for a great number of responsibilities (according to Articles 72 and 
74) and the principle of federal law overriding state law. Even in areas of 
genuine state responsibilities, the Länder's competences have been re-
trenched as a result of larger responsibility sharing and joint decision 
making. 
The German constitution makes some attempt to divide government 
functions among the tiers vertically--exclusive competences are defined 
for the federal government--, yet its approach to federalism differs sig-
nificantly from the models of the Anglo-Saxon world. At the central 
level, emphasis is laid on legislative functions, the allocation of financial 
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resources and the formulation of policy guidelines. States and local go-
vernments are generally in charge of implementing and administering 
policies. Lower levels of governments often "execute" policies on behalf 
of higher levels, where financing is sometimes tied to the function per-
formed, with corresponding grants or cost restitution. Based of federal 
legislation, such functions may also have to be financed by the lower 
tiers from own resources and without compensation. Central administra-
tion is less developed in general, and the states bear the brunt of ad-
ministrative responsibilities in Germany (including for tax administra-
tion). This particular division of functions--central decision-making with 
decentralized execution--has been labeled the "horizontal" approach to 
federalism--in contrast to the "vertical" model of the Anglo-Saxon world 
(Spahn 1978).  
At the level of financial arrangements, the horizontal distribution of 
functions is matched by the prevalence of revenue sharing. All major 
taxes (income, corporate income, value-added taxes) accrue to federal 
and state governments jointly. Legislation on taxes is uniform and cen-
tralized. Parliaments of regional jurisdictions have no power to legislate 
on taxes despite the fact that some smaller taxes continue to be as-
signed to state or local governments. All taxes are assessed according to 
the same national tax code--in particular as regards the tax base.15 
Virtually every law affecting the interests of the states has to pass the 
Bundesrat, the states' legislative assembly which, unlike the equivalent in 
other federations as the United States, Canada or Australia, is a true 
states' House in the sense that its members are appointed by state gov-
ernments, recalled by them, and strictly bound by the directives of their 
respective governments. The status of the Bundesrat in federal le-
gislation has given the German states jointly a very strong position, 
which counterbalances the loss of individual state sovereignty in specific 
areas.  
3.3. General arrangements  
a. Expenditure assignment 
As to the vertical distribution of responsibilities, the Constitution assigns 
defense, foreign affairs, citizenship, immigration and emigration, inter-
national treaties, currency matters, federal transport, postal and tele-
communication services to the federal government. The states are re-
                                       
15 Some discretion as to the setting of tax rates is accorded to local governments, 
however. 
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sponsible for remaining areas like culture, education, law and order, for 
environmental and health policies as well as for regional economic pol-
icy. Municipalities act in such fields as communal services (sewerage 
etc.), health, sports and recreation, school building, housing and road 
construction. Yet in light of the foregoing remarks, it would be wrong to 
expect this division of functions to be reflected in government outlays 
given the high degree of horizontal integration of functions. Social policy 
(including health and education), for instance, is exerted at all levels of 
government. The same is true for investment in infrastructure (roads, 
communication, structures) where responsibilities are shared. Since 
higher levels of government tend to delegate the execution of much of 
their functions to lower levels, outlays by level of government are a poor 
indicator of responsibilities. For instance, local governments disburse 
about two thirds of all public capital expenditure much of which is com-
missioned by higher levels of government.  
The distribution of expenditure functions among layers of government is 
found in Table 3. 
Table 3: The structure of public expenditures  
by level of government 1992 
 
- in percent of total expenditures of territorial authorities -  
EC share   3.5  
Federal government   36.6  
Länder   35.7  
Local governments   24.3  
Total of territorial 
authorities 
  100.
0  
Social security funds   62.2  
Special funds   5.5  
 
Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch 1993 für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
p. 533; own calculations 
 
b. Tax assignment and revenue sharing 
In Germany the power to legislate on specific taxes has to be seen as to-
tally distinct from the right of each layer of government to appropriate 
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the proceeds from these taxes. Tax legislation is fully centralized. Tax 
assignment to specific levels of governments is secured by the Constitu-
tion, with only minor adjustments to be made through federal legisla-
tion. Major revisions of federal financial arrangements can only be made 
through an amendment of the Constitution requiring a two-third major-
ity in both Houses of the federal parliament. 
The significance of taxes directly assigned to each layer of government 
is small in Germany. The main federal taxes (14 per cent of total taxes in 
1992) are excises, the most important of which are those on mineral oil, 
tobacco and alcohol (except beer). The federal government has also the 
right to levy a surcharge on income taxes, which will become more im-
portant in the future.16 The main state taxes (5 per cent of total taxes) 
are the motor-vehicle tax and the net wealth tax--a rather unimportant 
levy in Germany. Apart from the local business tax, municipalities em-
ploy a property tax as well as communal levies on public services (utili-
ties). Local governments collect about 8 percent of all taxes. 
All of the most important revenue sources are exploited by shared taxes 
in Germany. The wage and assessed income taxes, the corporation tax 
and VAT which yield about three quarters of total tax revenue are all 
jointly appropriated. In addition, the local business tax--although offi-
cially not a joint tax--is also shared by all levels of government. From its 
share of VAT, the federal government has to finance the contributions to 
the budget of the European Union.  
 
Table 4: Vertical distribution of joint taxes 
among levels of government in Germany 
(after Federal Consolidation Program) 
- in percent of revenue collected- 
Joint tax Federal Länder Local 
Personal income tax 42½ 42½ 15 
Corporate income 
tax 
50 50 0 
Value-added tax 56 44 0 
Source: Grundgesetz, and Federal Consolidation Program (see discussion 
below).  
                                       
16 Surcharges on income taxes were introduced towards the end of the sixties as a 
countercyclical device for demand management, but became outmoded shortly after-
wards. After more than 20 years such levy is now being used to finance the unification 
process. 
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The vertical distribution of income taxes is fixed by the Constitution (see 
Table 4) and, except for grants, any adjustment of the vertical distribu-
tion of public funds is exclusively effected through the shares of turn-
over taxes (VAT) to be renegotiated between federal and state govern-
ments. The result of this bargaining is cast into a federal law requiring 
the consent of the Bundesrat. 
The horizontal distribution of income taxes follows the regional pattern 
of tax yields according to the residence principle with special rules for 
the apportionment of the corporation tax. The regional distribution of 
VAT is essentially on a per capita basis (which implies a strong implicit 
equalization effect). 
c. Vertical grants and cooperative federalism 
Before unification, the German federal machinery did not employ vertical 
general-revenue grants to any substantial degree. They would have 
made little sense within tax sharing arrangements that allow vertical ad-
justments through the share of VAT. However, the federal government 
used a small portion of its VAT for asymmetrical vertical equalization: 
so-called supplementary grants. These are unconditional and designed 
to support the poorer states of the federation. After unification and with 
the implementation of the Federal Consolidation Program discussed be-
low, asymmetrical vertical grants will become more important in the fu-
ture, though. 
Furthermore, there were and are vertical specific grants that imply fed-
eral cofinancing of state projects. These grants are conditional and oper-
ate within a complex network of interstate cooperation. Such coopera-
tion is governed by a great number of treaties and agreements among 
authorities and cannot be discussed here. Only two more important con-
stitutional provisions for policy coordination are reviewed in some detail: 
"joint tasks", which imply joint-decision-making and responsibility-
sharing in combination with joint planning and financing, as well as spe-
cific grants-in-aid. These are peculiar features of the German federal ar-
rangements.17  
These elements of cooperative federalism were introduced in 1969 when 
it had become clear that federal legislation alone was not sufficient to 
coordinate policies at the central level. The federal division of functions-
-with framework legislation assigned to the center and the im-
plementation of policies to the lower tiers of government--was deficient 
                                       
17 For a fuller discussion see, for instance, Reissert (1978). 
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in view of the (then important) goals of coordinated stabilization poli-
cies.18 The model also precluded the federal government from setting 
guidelines or prerogatives within those areas in which policies cannot be 
controlled by legislation, that is the provision of public goods and serv-
ices, especially public infrastructure. It was in these policy domains that 
the planning and spending functions attributed to the Länder proved to 
be more important than the legislative functions assigned to the federal 
government. 
The two instruments created in 1969 were "joint tasks" (Gemeinschafts-
aufgaben) according to Articles 91a and 91b, and grants-in-aid (Finanz-
hilfen) according to Article 104 a (4) of the Constitution. Joint tasks are 
determined for five policy areas.19 Grants-in-aid are given to the states 
for regional and local investments within certain policy areas to be de-
fined by federal law or by federal-state agreement. Again the unifor-
mity-of-living-conditions principle is visible in these arrangements as 
the Constitution stipulates such grants to be used only for equalizing re-
gional disparities, for stabilization, and for stimulating growth. 
The new provisions have legalized anterior practices by which the federal 
government had provided funds to the Länder on a bilateral basis. The 
new instruments stress multilateral agreement instead--at least for the 
joint tasks--which is established within so-called "planning committees" 
(Planungsausschüsse) wherein the federal government shares the votes 
with all of the states. All state projects adopted by the federal govern-
ment and a majority of states are jointly planned and financed. These in-
struments have increased the scope for center government intervention 
in many ways, not only through its impact on the planning process itself 
(in particular on the selection of projects), but also through the potential 
threat to withdraw federal cofinancing--that usually covers half of the 
costs.20  
                                       
18 The centralization of competence as a consequence of policy coordination for 
stabilization purposes has reached its peak at the end of the sixties, when Article 109 
Grundgesetz was amended (1967), the Stability and Growth Law was enacted (1967), a 
Business Cycle Council (Konjunkturrat) and a Finance Planning Council (Finanzpla-
nungsrat) were established and the principles governing the budgets of federal and 
states governments were harmonized (1969). 
19 These are (i) university construction, (ii) regional policy, (iii) agricultural structural 
policy and coast preservation, as well as (iv) the planning of education, and (v) the fos-
tering of research to the extent that these are of supraregional importance.  
20 The Federal contribution varies, though. It is 60 percent for agricultural policy 
measures, and 70 percent for coast preservation. 
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Table 5:  Sources of revenue  
for each level of government in Germany 
(before Federal Consolidation Program) 
 
- in per cent of total revenue - 
Revenue source Federal  State Local 
Exclusive taxes 22 9 4 
Shared taxes 70 64 30 
Unconditional bloc 
grants 
- 1 11 
Specific purpose 
grants 
- 14 11 
Other 8 12 43 
Total revenue 100 100 100 
Source: Spahn (1993). 
The vertical distribution of resources according to source and transfer 
category including the effects of cooperative federalism are depicted in 
Table 5 which characterizes the status quo prior to the Federal Consoli-
dation Program. The amendments by these programs, which account for 
the situation after unification, are described below. 
d. Horizontal grants and equalization 
One particular feature of German federalism is the existence of interstate 
equalization, the Finanzausgleich. This equalization is achieved through 
a specific set of rules governing a "brotherly" second-round redistri-
bution of means among the states themselves. The following portrayal 
reports the status before unification when the federal government was 
not involved in this process (except for legislation); the amendments ac-
commodating entry of the new Länder are described below. 
The process starts from  
• a definition of a state and local fiscal capacity measure for any one 
Land (Steuerkraftmesszahl) which is roughly the sum of state tax 
revenues corrected for special burdens and local tax revenues ad-
justed for population density, the degree of urbanization etc. This 
measure is then related to  
• an equalization yardstick for this particular Land (Ausgleichsmesszahl) 
which is derived from the average per capita fiscal capacity of all par-
ticipating states multiplied by the population of that Land.  
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Any shortfall of fiscal capacity in relation to the yardstick is equalized in 
steps with graduated rates. A uniform average is not secured, yet there 
is a guarantee that fiscal capacity (including equalization payments) 
should reach at least 95 per cent of the average for the states as a 
whole. 
Equalization payments are made by those states, the fiscal capacity of 
which exceeds the yardstick, again in graduated contributions. The sys-
tem works as a clearing mechanism, i.e. payments made by the finan-
cially stronger states always equal the sum of receipts of the weaker 
states. 
Financial settlement among states had a rather strong equalizing effect 
in the past21, and, in the beginning, the mechanism has worked reasona-
bly well. Yet the burden of the settlement was consistently shifted onto 
two states--Baden-Wuertemberg and Hessen--while all others either 
benefited or were exempt from contributing to the scheme. This had led 
to political tensions among the states even before unification. The Fed-
eral Consolidation Program has changed these provisions and comple-
mented it by asymmetrical vertical grants, yet its spirit remained virtually 
intact. 
e. Borrowing 
The institutional limits on deficit financing in Germany are twofold: 
• Para. 20 of the Law on the Bundesbank restricts borrowing from the 
central bank of all tiers of government (local governments have no ac-
cess to this form of financing at all). There are ceilings for this type of 
borrowing fixed by legislation, and the amounts involved are rather 
small.  
• The Constitution restricts federal government borrowing to the 
"amount of projected outlays for investment purposes in the budget" 
(golden rule). Similar rules apply to Länder budgeting in accordance 
with state Constitutions or legislation. Local government borrowing is 
tied to their cash flow and subject to state control. 
Budget constraints thus appear to be rather tough in Germany. Notably 
the "quasi-constitutional" limits to central bank financing are often 
praised as being the grounds for low inflation, a strong currency and fi-
nancial stability of the German public sector. In principle, this nexus 
cannot be denied--especially as legislation has rendered the Bundes-
                                       
21 Compare the calculations made in Spahn (1977), pp. 222 ff. 
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bank legally independent from federal and state intervention. Yet one 
could argue that the system had not been put to any severe test in the 
past, and that it had worked largely because is was based on a consen-
sus formed by all political parties and interest groups--in particular tra-
ding partners. The test of German unification made it clear, however, 
that judicial control of budget deficits is difficult to achieve--even with 
constitutional constraints.  
The budget constraint had been "softened" in many respects even before 
unification: 
• It is far from clear what is meant by "investment purposes". It is possi-
ble to redefine current outlays such as to represent investment outlays 
without much difficulty in some instances. 
• An amendment of the Constitution made in 1969 has permitted the 
federal government to raise loan money in order to combat "distur-
bances of general economic equilibrium". This rule is even more diffi-
cult to monitor in quantitative terms. The provision was introduced in 
the heydays of macroeconomic demand management. Application of 
this rule reached its climax only recently, however, when "disturbance 
of general economic equilibrium" was interpreted as relating to the 
consequences of unification.  
• German unification with its massive needs to transfer resources from 
one part of the country to the other has encouraged yet another strat-
egy to dissimulate budget deficits and to soften legal budget con-
straint: "off-budget" funding. All such funds rely heavily on loan fi-
nance. 
Central bank independence is in fact the cornerstone for budgetary dis-
cipline of the German public sector. Yet it should be clear that deficit fi-
nancing is much "softer" than may surface at first sight. Restrictive con-
stitutional rules and monetary policies could not prevent the German 
public sector from running significant deficits more recently. While, in 
1990, the debt/GDP ratio was 43 percent--to which Länder contributed 
14, and local governments only 6 percentage points--, this ratio will 
have jumped to two thirds of GDP by the end of 1994. 
The repercussions of German unification on deficit financing and public 
debts are shown in Table 6 that illustrates government borrowing and 
accumulated debts by level of government at the passage to the new 
federal arrangements. It also reveals the importance of off budget fi-
nancing in this context.  
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Table 6:  Indebtedness of German Public Budgets by 1994 
 End-of-year  
indebtedness 
Deficit 
 bill. of 
DM 
% of GDP bill. of 
DM 
% of 
GDP 
Level of government     
Federal 750.5 23.2 71.0 2.2 
States 467.0 14.4 42.0 1.3 
Local 177.0 5.5 10.0 0.3 
Off-budget funding     
European Recovery Pro-
gram 
43.0 1.3 7.0 0.2 
German Unity Fund 95.0 2.9 5.0 0.2 
Kreditabwicklungsfonds 140.0 4.3 − − 
Treuhandanstalt 250.0 7.7 − − 
Debts of local housing 
projects in East Germany 
30.0 0.9 − − 
Federal Railways (Bun-
desbahn) 
79.5 2.5 9.5 0.3 
Federal Mail (Bundespost) 129.0 4.0 11.0 0.3 
Total 2161.0 67.0 155.5  4.8 
 
Sources: Deutsche Bundesbank (1993); DIW (1993); Gemeindefi-
nanzbericht 1993; Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft (1993); Müller 
(1993); own calculations. 
3.4. Administrative structure 
a. Tax administration 
As mentioned before, the structure of administration exhibits a great va-
riety and complexity, and the central government plays only a modest 
role in direct administration. This is particularly true with regard to reve-
nue raising, which is effected by tax offices that are part of state admini-
strations. According to the Constitution (Art. 108), the federal govern-
ment is to administer customs duties, fiscal monopolies, excises subject 
to federal legislation (including on imports) and charges imposed within 
the framework of the European Union. All other taxes, in particular in-
come taxes and VAT, are administered by the Länder. To the extent that 
taxes accrue wholly or in part to the federal government, Land revenue 
authorities act as agents of the federation and are entitled to cost resti-
tution for their services rendered. The organization of tax administration 
is, however, uniform, standardized and highly coordinated by federal 
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legislation or intergovernmental agreements, as is the ruling on fiscal 
courts and the training of tax administrators.  
As to taxes the revenue of which accrues exclusively to local govern-
ments, their administration is wholly or in part transferred, by the states, 
to communal revenue authorities. 
b. Budget formulation and implementation 
The Constitution stipulates in its Article 109, that the Federation and the 
Länder shall be autonomous and independent from each other as to their 
fiscal administration and budgeting. However, the tiers of government 
are obliged to take due account of the requirements of overall equilib-
rium which is achieved by federal legislation requiring the consent of the 
Bundesrat.  
The Constitution (Article 110) as well as a federal law on budgetary prin-
ciples for the Federation and the Länder,22 coordinate the budget process 
as well as its performance by guidance of uniform principles to be ob-
served by all authorities. Such principles extent from very general provi-
sions (like the principles of gross estimates, comprehensiveness, unity, 
clarity, periodicity and antecedence, efficiency and cost effectiveness, 
authorization to spend and to commit resources) to more specific rules 
regarding the preparation of the budget, to accounting and the render-
ing of accounts (including the classification of the budget), to auditing 
and discharge, and to rules applying for special funds set up under fed-
eral or state legislation. Also, the budget process was rendered more 
transparent in order to assess the budget's effects on the general course 
of the economy. The second part of this legislation contains regulations 
that are generally and directly applicable to the Federation and the 
Länder like multi-year financial planning and the exchange of budget-
related information. 
The annual budgets (calendar year) have to be embedded in a medium-
term financial plan that is established jointly by the Financial Planning 
Council representing all three tiers of government. Its objective is to 
reach agreement on the coordination of general budgetary policy and to 
support the federal government in its statutory task to achieve a harmo-
nized stability-oriented budgetary and fiscal policy. The Financial Plan-
ning Council is, however, bound by the Constitution to respect autono-
                                       
22 This law of 1969, was published in English, together with other relevant material 
under the title Federal German Budget Legislation, by the Federal Ministry of Finance, 
Bonn, November 1988. 
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mous and independent fiscal administration of states and the right of 
self-governance of municipalities. It therefore acts through recommen-
dations that are non-binding, yet have a strong impact on budget esti-
mates and budget execution (including the level of borrowing). 
3.5. Macroeconomic Implications 
Towards the end of the sixties, Germany pioneered legislation on mac-
roeconomic management. A Stability and Growth Law was enacted which 
commits the federal government to accomplish certain macroeconomic 
targets and which provides a number of specific instruments enabling 
authorities to pursue demand management policies effectively. An inter-
governmental Business-Cycle Council (Konjunkturrat) was established 
which was to guide governments in coordinating their budgets--apart 
from medium-term planning--, and an attempt was made to influence 
trading partners through concerted action (Konzertierte Aktion). Yet 
formal coordination essentially failed--except for the very beginning--
as the crises of the early seventies were found to be structural in nature 
and the arsenal of policy instruments provided by legislation inappropri-
ate for such purposes. Furthermore, macroeconomic demand manage-
ment had rapidly become unfashionable in Germany, and the instru-
ments provided by the Stability and Growth Law were in the doldrums.  
However, fiscal federal arrangements allowed the federal government to 
take a lead in reacting to economic shocks provoked by the oil crises, 
and it was possible to restore macroeconomic stability in conjunction 
with the central bank policy during the eighties. During the same period, 
the rapid expansion of social expenditures was curbed, and financial 
stability maintained at all levels of government--despite weaknesses in 
the economy. Ironically, the instruments created for demand manage-
ment a quarter of a century ago would experience a revival in view of the 
greatest challenge to fiscal policy of recent years: German unification. 
3.6. German unification23 
a. Background 
On October 3rd, 1990, five new Eastern states24 joined the Federal Re-
public of Germany that had formerly been administered centrally by a 
                                       
23 For further details see Föttinger/Spahn (1994). 
24 East Berlin merged with West Berlin that had formerly existed as a West German 
state under special rule (still being controlled by the Western Allies of World War II). 
There are plans to merge Berlin with Brandenburg towards the end of the decade. 
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socialist government. The West German currency was adopted even be-
fore unification, and the tax system was introduced in rapid steps almost 
entirely.25  
The effects on fiscal federal relations were and are still enormous. Pro-
ductivity levels are significantly lower in the East, which--together with 
concomitant unemployment and short-time work--reduces taxable ca-
pacity. On the other hand, demands for government services are colos-
sal. Without equalization payments from the West, large public sector 
deficits would have emanated for Eastern German state and communal 
budgets. Such predicaments implied a fundamental revision of fiscal 
federal arrangements in Germany. 
b. Preliminary response 
Vertical tax assignment remained unaltered under the new conditions. 
Also, the horizontal tax apportionment of shared income taxes did not 
pose major problems as the residence (or tax yield) principle is applied. 
From an equity point of view, however, income taxes are distributed very 
unevenly--exacerbated by the progressivity of the tariff, as income lev-
els are much lower in the East.26 On the other hand, the distribution of 
VAT rouse a major political controversy since it is apportioned on a per 
capita basis implying strong horizontal equalization effects at the ex-
pense of Western state budgets. Nevertheless, and in spite of initial re-
sistance by Western Länder, the system now applies to Germany as a 
whole--letting the East benefit significantly from the higher taxable ca-
pacity of the West.  
However, Western states would not allow their Eastern counterparts to 
participate in the horizontal equalization arrangements. If the scheme 
had been extended to the new States without modification, all of the 
former beneficiaries of equalization payments in the West would have 
turned into contributors, and the total volume of clearing payments 
would have quintupled (from 5 to 25 billion DM). An immediate integra-
tion of the new Länder would have jeopardized the entire system of in-
tergovernmental solidarity. This led to the creation of the extra budget-
ary German Unity Fund as a temporary device. Yet new rules on inter-
                                       
25 Some taxes--like the wealth tax--will not be introduced in East Germany since its 
administrative burden was considered too heavy for the new states. There are also 
some minor tax concessions given to the residents of Eastern states. 
26 This effect is accentuated by special deductions from the tax base accorded to 
residents of the former GDR. 
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governmental financial relations as stipulated by the Treaty on Unifica-
tion were to be established from 1995 on.  
The objective of the German Unity Fund, inaugurated in 1991, was to 
strengthen the inadequate revenue basis of the new Länder by uncondi-
tional grants. Originally, a sum of DM 115 billion, now DM 161 billion, 
was to be channeled through this Fund to the Eastern states for 1990-
94. Of the latter amount, DM 50 billion are contributions from the Fed-
eration, DM 16 billion derive from state budgets, and the remainder is to 
be borrowed from capital markets. The federal government and Western 
state and municipal authorities in equal proportions carry the servicing 
of these loans. The new Länder are apportioned resources from the Fund 
according to their population, and they are obliged to hand down to their 
municipalities 40 per cent of payments received. 
Table 7:  Net Public Transfers to East Germany  
(billions of DM) 
 1991 1992 19931) 19941) 
Transfers to new Länder and 
municipalities 
108.3 113.5 125.9 130.0 
- German Unity Fund2) 35.0 33.9 35.2 34.6 
- Outlays of federal government 59.2 65.1 72.2 76.0 
- VAT distribution of the Länder 10.8 11.5 12.0 12.5 
- Outlays of old Länder 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.0 
- Revenue losses3) 1.3 3.0 3.5 3.9 
Social insurance funds 20.9 32.1 37.0 35.5 
- Unemployment benefits 20.9 30.6 32.1 28.5 
- Pension scheme - 1.5 4.9 7.0 
Total transfers 129.2 148.1 162.9 165.5 
 
1) Estimated; 2)1990: DM 22 bill.; 3) Investment subsidies given as tax re-
bates. 
Source: Joint Report of the leading economic research institutes and Fed-
eral Ministry of Finance (1993). 
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Further income transfers supporting Eastern governments and citizens 
included: specific-purpose payments by the federal government; invest-
ment credits of the European Recovery Program (ERP); direct transfers 
from the West German unemployment insurance scheme and pension 
funds; and direct payments from the old Länder. 
Table 7 illustrates the transfers and benefits appropriated by regional 
governments and private households of the new states, yet it does not 
picture the full scale of interregional support accorded to the East Ger-
man economy. In order to facilitate transition from a socialist to a mar-
ket-oriented economy, some additional extra budgetary institutions 
were created that all impact on interregional transfers and government 
finance.  
c. Extra budgetary funding 
The more important federal institutions involved in the transition proc-
ess are the following: 
Treuhandanstalt (THA) --This is a state agency or government trust in 
charge of privatizing East German businesses, the formerly state-owned 
corporations. It is controlled by the federal Ministry of Finance. At the 
start, it was hoped that THA could eventually generate a surplus from 
selling off the formerly state-owned Eastern economy. However, the 
capital stock to be privatized was largely obsolete and its real value far 
below expectations. Massive subsidies had to be given to potential in-
vestors as incentives to buy firms and to sustain jobs, thus the value of 
the capital sold proved to be negative.  
THA will have a limited existence though. It is to be wound-up at the 
end of 1994, its continuing task being to supervise about 40000 sales 
contracts and to dispose of the remaining real estate. The organization 
will leave the central government with an expected net debt of about 
250 bill. DM of which slightly more than 40 percent will have incurred on 
restructuring and investment costs; the remainder reflects operating 
losses. It will also hand over to the federal government the care for a 
number of unsold "industrial core" firms with about a quarter of a million 
employees requiring an estimated 45 bill. DM for restructuring. 
Kreditabwicklungsfonds--This is a fund created to wind-up debt inher-
ited from the former GDR government and from currency conversion. 
When the German economic, monetary and social union was inaugurated 
(July 1990), private demand deposits and savings up to a limit per East 
German citizen were converted into DM at parity. Savings above this limit 
and other financial assets and liabilities were converted at DM 1 = M 2. 
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Since assets of most banks were transformed into DM at a lower rate 
than liabilities, net assets of the banking system had to be topped up by 
claims against the Conversion Fund (Fonds Währungsumstellung). These 
obligations now amount up to approximately DM 110 billion, liabilities 
not resulting from currency conversion to DM 30 billion (Deutsche Bun-
desbank 1993). 
d. The "new" system of fiscal federal relations.  
Besides the intensive use of loans, an income tax surcharge of 7.5 per-
cent on all income tax payments was applied from July 1991 until June 
1992. The proceeds of this surcharge accrued solely to the federal gov-
ernment. Furthermore, the VAT rate was raised from 14 to 15 percent at 
the beginning of 1993. Finally, the mineral oil tax and the insurance tax 
were increased. 
As regards the interstate equalization scheme, it was temporarily ef-
fected for the two groups of states in isolation--waiting for a final solu-
tion. This form of redistributing public revenue is of minor interest to 
the Eastern states which all command resources at an evenly low level. 
The new system of fiscal federal relation scheduled to be introduced in 
1995 by the Treaty of Unification passed the federal parliament (Bunde-
stag) in June 1993 as part of the so-called Federal Consolidation Pro-
gram (FCP). This package of bills was to establish a solid and lasting ba-
sis for German fiscal federal arrangements. 
The provisions made by the FCP as to the financial equipment of Länder 
budgets are the following: 
• In order to compensate the old Länder for the extra burden imposed 
onto them, VAT shares between the federal and the state level are to 
be changed from 63/37 per cent to 56/44 per cent, which increases 
the scope of implicit equalization significantly. 
• The new Länder will be fully integrated in the horizontal equalization 
scheme. The equalization formula will be changed in some respects, 
for example will the progressivity of payments made by rich states be 
reduced. 
• The formerly less important asymmetrical vertical grants will become 
more salient. Two types of unconditional grants replace the former 
federal supplementary grants. Type A grants are given to financially 
weak states in both East and West. These funds will make up for the 
shortfall of revenue, after interstate equalization, of 90 per cent of av-
erage fiscal capacity per capita. Grants will also be given to some of 
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the Western states in order to countervail losses they suffer as a result 
from incorporating the Eastern states into interstate equalization 
(Fehlbetrags-Bundesergänzungszuweisungen). Type B grants are also 
unconditional but are attributed in response of "special needs" of 
some of the states (Sonderbedarf-Bundesergänzungszuweisungen).27 
Additionally, the severely indebted states of Saarland and Bremen will 
receive financial aid for the amortization of outstanding debt. The 
Eastern states will obtain conditional grants-in-aid for a ten year pe-
riod in order to enable them fostering investment and economic 
growth. 
• The federal government will be compensated by the reintroduction of 
an income tax surcharge of 7.5 per cent on all personal and corporate 
income tax payments. Furthermore, savings are expected from the 
termination of transfers to the German Unity Fund as well as other ex-
penditure cuts like the reduction of unemployment benefits. 
• A most important new financial institution to be created in this con-
text is a sinking fund, the so-called Inherited Burden Fund (Erblasten-
fonds). The fund will take over all debt and liabilities inherited directly 
or indirectly from the vanished German Democratic Republic. It com-
prises the debts of the THA, of the Kreditabwicklungsfonds, and of 
East German local housing projects. More than DM 400 billion will 
have to be amortized within the next thirty years. 
                                       
27 These needs result from a relatively high costs of political administration incurred 
by small states and the still enormous deficiencies of Eastern states as to their public 
infrastructure. 
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Table 8:  The effects of the Federal Consolidation Program  
on federal and state budgets in 1995 
bill. of DM 
 (−) = outlays, (+) = revenues 
Federal 
Govern-
ment 
Länder 
- West - 
Länder 
- East - 
I. Claims and obligations 
 
Inherited Burden Fund −37.5   
VAT distribution and interstate 
equalization 
−18.1 −16.8 +34.8 
Unconditional grants type A −6.4 +2.3 +4.1 
Unconditional grants type B −7.0  +7.0 
Grants-in-aid −10.0  +10.0 
Special aid to Saarland, Bremen −3.4 +3.4  
Other expenditure −5.8 +1.4 −1.4 
 
Sum of I. 
−88.2 −9.7 +54.5 
II. Sources of refinancing 
 
Expenditure cuts +4.4 +3.0 +1.2 
Cuts of subsidies +4.8 +1.8 +0.1 
Income tax surcharge +28.0   
 
Sum of II. 
+37.2 +4.8 +1.3 
III. Winding-up of former claims and obligations 
 
German Unity Fund +17.6 +7.2 −29.8 
Berlin support +6.2  −6.2 
Debt service Kreditabwicklungs-
fonds 
+5.0   
Former federal supplementary 
grants 
+4.5 -4.5  
 
Sum of III. 
+33.3 +2.7 −36.0 
 
Net redistribution effect for 1995 
 
−17.7 
 
−2.2 
 
+19.8 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance (1992, 1993) and Institut der deutschen 
Wirtschaft (1993). 
 
Spahn, Paul Bernd (1995), ”China’s Reform of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in the Light 
of European Experiences”, in Jayanta Roy (ed.), Macroeconomic Management and Fiscal 
Decentralization, EDI Seminar Series, The World Bank, Washington D.C., 125-162.  
35 
Table 8 shows estimations of the claims and obligations resulting from 
FCP in 1995. Compared with the interim solution of the period 1990-94, 
with the German Unity Fund as the main pillar, the Eastern Länder now 
receive an additional amount of DM 19.8 billion, the bigger part of which 
is borne by the federal budget (DM 17.7 billion). Only a small burden is 
heaped upon the Western Länder (DM 2.2 billion). 
3.7. Conclusions 
German fiscal federal relations have created a high degree of homogene-
ity as to the regional availability of public infrastructure and government 
services. This is the basis on which the economy thrives. Financing pub-
lic services is mainly based on shared taxes and equalization arrange-
ments stressing the uniformity of living conditions in the whole nation, 
and on horizontal cooperation among layers of government. This has not 
prevented regional authorities from exerting an influential role within 
the realm of their own jurisdiction and at the level of the Federation.  
The spirit of these arrangements has survived the strain put onto the 
system by German unification. However, the experience of the FCP has 
revealed the solidarity among the Länder to have limitations. VAT shar-
ing with its implicit equalization effects as well as asymmetrical vertical 
grants by the federal government were preferred to explicit horizontal 
redistribution as embodied in the Finanzausgleich. These developments 
will, however, strengthen over time the role of the federal government 
through its increased role in intergovernmental finance. 
4. A European's view on fiscal federal relations in China 
This final chapter must begin with a word of caution: Any foreign scholar 
of federalism must fail in doing full justice to the cultural heritage and 
traditions of China when commenting on its system of intergovernmental 
relations and its options for reform. Intergovernmental relations are in-
deed largely shaped by historical processes in all federations of the 
world. There are a great variety of models adopted, and all of the solu-
tions found seem to work reasonably well within their general political 
and constitutional framework. This does not preclude institutional 
change and innovation, yet the philosophy reigning federal arrange-
ments in each country seems to be firmly rooted, and it is not aban-
doned very easily--as illustrated by the German case after unification. 
There are a great number of studies relating to intergovernmental rela-
tions in the context of other federations, and conforming policy recom-
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mendations for China.28 These will not be commented here. The author 
rather wants to address some of the key problems relating to Chinese 
reforms from his own standpoint and to pose the question how a Euro-
pean would tackle these problems against the background of his own 
experience. 
4.1 Expenditure assignment 
It is crucial for China's intergovernmental fiscal relations that expendi-
ture functions be assigned clearly and unequivocally in order to avoid 
duplication, political conflict, and a waste of economic resources. The 
theory of federalism provides guidance in establishing such a division of 
functions. Also, international comparison may help in many respects.  
Outlay functions should be assigned to the provincial level whenever 
demand for public services differs among regions. The region can then 
better tailor its public services to local demand, which is more efficient 
than a uniform provision of the service. This is the essence of the "de-
centralization theorem" of the theory of federalism. The European Union 
has even reversed the burden of proof by adopting the "subsidiarity 
principle" according to which public functions should always be exer-
cised at the lowest possible tier unless they are positively proven to be 
serviced more effectively at a higher level of government. 
Moreover, political identities are primarily formed at the local level. Na-
tional identities are more abstract and are acquired only at a later stage 
of personal development. This is why education and support of cultural 
activities, for instance, are such important functions of regional govern-
ment. Education and culture also serve as a powerful tool to protecting 
and preserving regional minority groups. Other important regional func-
tions are public order, public welfare, health care, regional and local land 
planning, roads, the use of water and other resources, the protection of 
the environment, the fostering of research, science and arts, universities 
and vocational training.  
Decentralization of functions may also be warranted on administrative 
grounds. Provinces are typically closer to citizens and problems, and 
they may administer certain functions more competently than the central 
government. Decentralization on these grounds is almost dictated by the 
sheer size of China with some provinces rivaling with the bigger Euro-
pean nations (except Russia) in population size. This does not exclude 
the possibility that provinces operate within national framework legisla-
                                       
28  See, in particular, the studies by Ahmad and others, as well as Anonymous and 
Gao Qiang in the references. 
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tion or perform delegated state functions on behalf of the central gov-
ernment.  
The allocation of expenditure functions among the tiers of government 
will have a bearing on intergovernmental relations as well. For instance, 
autonomous provincial functions require the availability of unconditional 
revenue, which must be either own funds or closed-ended general 
grants but can be used at the discretion of the region. Provincial services 
provided within the realm of national policies may be consistent with 
special-purpose payments conditioned on observing national standards 
or framework legislation. Delegated functions, finally, would seem to re-
quire open-ended cost coverage grants (gap filling). In the latter case it 
is essential that the central government has, however, full control over 
the expenditure side and that inefficient cost maximization by provinces 
can be avoided.  
4.2 Tax assignment 
Once a clear division of functions has been established, the next step is 
to solve the tax assignment problem. This problem is often exacerbated 
by constitutional or political constraints, and occasional adjustments are 
necessary in order to take new developments into account. The assign-
ment of taxes is crucial both for the vertical fiscal balance as well as the 
scope for first-round horizontal equalization. A robust local tax system 
may also contribute to mobilizing additional resources for public serv-
ices as well as to enhance the efficiency and equity of the tax system as 
a whole.29 
Europeans tend to assign customs duties and indirect taxes to the cen-
tral government, and direct taxes to regions. This is true for the Euro-
pean Union as a whole, and it also applies--in principle--to Germany 
and Switzerland. The major taxes can be exploited conjointly between 
tiers of government. VAT is shared by the European Union and its mem-
ber states, as it is shared between the federal and state governments in 
Germany. The sharing of income taxes is strictly brought to bear only in 
Germany whereas Switzerland uses income taxes concurrently at all lev-
els of government.  
China has also adopted the sharing of VAT among central and provincial 
governments. However, the level of personal income tax is still low and 
there is little scope for sharing the tax between levels of government at 
present. The corporate income tax--which is now assigned to govern-
                                       
29  See Spahn (1994) in this volume. 
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ments according to the ownership principle--may however become sub-
ject to tax sharing in the nearer future.30 
4.3  Discretionary tax policy 
Discretionary tax policy of lower-level governments is very high at the 
European level. It is substantial for cantons of the Swiss Confederation, 
but non-existent for the German states where national legislation, re-
quiring the consent of the states, establishes uniform rules. However, 
even Germany accords some limited tax discretion to its local govern-
ments, albeit not for income taxes.31 Where it exists, discretion is high-
est in the realm of income taxation. In Switzerland, where income tax 
bases are increasingly harmonized, cantonal sovereignty is reduced to 
the setting of tax rates. Regional taxes would then become similar to 
surcharges on a national income tax base. In Germany, the levying of a 
surcharge on income tax (not base) is a privilege of the central govern-
ment, however--in view of strengthening its macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion policies. 
There is thus no uniform approach to tax sovereignty in Europe, yet 
there is wide agreement among economists that some tax discretion 
should be given to lower levels of government--especially to municipali-
ties. This includes, of course, the right to borrow. 
4.4 Readjusting vertical fiscal imbalances 
The first-round arrangements should ideally avoid vertical financial im-
balances if some scope for vertical equalizing grants is taken into ac-
count. The purpose of the first round is to provide all governments with 
sufficiently high levels of general finance in order to allow them to func-
tion at a minimum level. If a robust horizontal distribution criterion (like 
weighted population) is embedded in these arrangements for a major 
joint tax, like VAT, the achievement of this goal does not require compli-
cated comparisons of standardized budgets. Also, adjustments to verti-
cal fiscal imbalances can easily be effected within the realm of tax shar-
ing--as illustrated by Germany for VAT. 
It is not easy to determine vertical financial imbalances however (except 
in extreme cases like Australia). If all layers of government are allowed to 
incur debt, the problem of vertical fiscal balance might be severely 
                                       
30  For a further elaboration of the argument see Spahn, P. B., "Local Taxation: Prin-
ciples and Scope" in this volume. 
31  The discretion is given for the land tax and the business tax (local tax on gross 
capital and gross profits of enterprises). 
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blurred. One rule should be to look predominantly on current expendi-
tures (including the servicing of outstanding debt) and regular revenue 
(including general revenue grants and tax sharing means that are avail-
able on a recurrent legal basis). These budgets should then approxi-
mately be balanced at vertical levels on average, and also allow some 
saving for the capital budget.32 Capital budgets should ideally be fi-
nanced by borrowing where the "golden rule" applies,33 but public bor-
rowing of all levels should be subject to institutional constraints at the 
macroeconomic level, which requires some intergovernmental policy co-
ordination.  
In a longer-term perspective, tax assignment cannot avoid emerging 
vertical fiscal imbalances however. Any assignment of taxes is arbitrary 
as to the development of outlay functions over the longer run. Tax shar-
ing allows responding flexibly to such structural changes by adjusting 
the proportion each tier of government acquires from the common reve-
nue pool. This is the solution adopted in Germany where the share of 
VAT is continuously adjusted to expenditure developments; it is also the 
method used to adjust VAT sharing at the level of the European Union.  
In China, a certain degree of fiscal imbalance in favor of the central gov-
ernment is, however, desirable since it creates the potential for equaliza-
tion through asymmetrical vertical grants. If no vertical fiscal imbalance 
would exist, on average, the central authority would have no room for 
equalization payments to the provinces. This is essentially the reason 
why explicit equalization provisions in Germany, where a vertical balance 
is aimed at, are established mainly at the horizontal level.34 Since an ex-
clusively horizontal equalization scheme seems to be out of question for 
China, equalizing vertical transfer payments requires financial scope at 
the center level.  
Some vertical imbalance in favor of particular regions may however be 
tolerated for the sake of political stability. For instance, if a resource tax 
                                       
32  If current budgets cannot be balanced among the tiers of government, the only 
adjustment is through tax policy, not through institutional redesign. 
33  This means that only capital formation is financed through borrowing which ex-
hibits returns allowing to service the debt. Where there are "social returns" that cannot 
be realized through the market, the government budget must service the debt through 
current outlays.   
34  It has to be recognized that equalization provisions are also implicit in the first-
round distribution of shared taxes, in particular of VAT, and that the federal govern-
ment--in a "third round"--exerts some residual equalization in Germany, especially 
after unification. 
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is fully pooled, some portion of the tax might be returned to the region 
where the resource is located. This portion may even be excluded from 
accounting for further equalization provisions. The resource-rich region 
may retain a bonus not only for reasons of political pacification, but also 
for reasons of extraordinary public services and infrastructure related to 
exploiting the taxed resource. This idea runs counter to the solution 
adopted in Germany where special regional conditions leading to a 
higher tax potential through royalties are evened out at the level of sec-
ond-round equalization. 
4.5 Regional apportionment of shared taxes 
The way shared taxes are apportioned among regions is of utmost im-
portance. This is because they can incorporate a built-in first-round 
equalization mechanism.  
If taxes are distributed according to the derivation principle, regional tax 
revenue reflects regional taxable potentials (assuming a uniform tax law 
and identical administrative efforts). This renders strong provinces 
strong, and leaves economically weaker provinces weak. Some would re-
gard this an appropriate strategy for economic development as tax 
money is redistributed to those provinces where the rates of return are 
highest. The argument is doubtful, however, mainly for three reasons:  
• First, a national economy forms an integral market, and prosperity of 
one region hinges on economic developments of other regions. 
Moreover, the strengthening of purchasing power in the nation as a 
whole may become a crucial factor for realizing economies of scale 
through mass-production. Such philosophy was a decisive element in 
the success of Ludwig Ehrhard's "social market economy" (Soziale 
Marktwirtschaft) in Germany.  
• Second, prosperous regions today may face structural difficulties to-
morrow, and some regional diversification of infrastructure may thus 
be welfare enhancing over a longer period. For instance, Germany has 
experienced a relative decline of the formerly prosperous North, while 
the previously "backward" South is now the engine of growth through 
its modern industries and services. The equalization scheme should 
flexibly respond to such structural change--as it has in Germany. 
• And finally, in the context of the Chinese economy with its still largely 
administered pricing system, it is by no means clear whether the now 
buoyant sectors or regions of the economy can sustain their prosper-
ity under fully liberalized market conditions. Administered prices may 
now shift profits to fundamentally non-viable industries while artifi-
cially reduce profits in other economic sectors. The latter could then 
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flourish once they are allowed to adopt competitive pricing and cost-
cutting policies.  
Whenever such conditions prevail, tax policy operates in a "second-best 
world" where equalization provisions can even be welfare enhancing. Of 
course, the main rationale for equalization is regional fairness and eq-
uity, but this argument hardly convinces the presently prospering prov-
inces. The efficiency argument may be more convincing here. 
Nevertheless, the derivation rule for shared taxes is strong and univer-
sal. It is used for personal income taxes in Switzerland and Germany 
where the residence principle applies. The rule is more difficult to apply 
to the corporate income tax if firms operate at the supraregional level. In 
these cases both European federations try to apportion the yield among 
regions according to indicators of regional economic activity.35 
The derivation principle applied to VAT, as in China, seems to exhibit 
undesirable and potentially disruptive consequences however.  
VAT is essentially a tax on consumption. It zero-rates exports as it ex-
onerates the formation of capital. One consequence could be that ex-
porting regions lose under such a scheme (through the tax credit to ex-
porters) while importing regions would benefit (through the collection of 
import tax). China has avoided such consequence by allowing the central 
government to collect the import tax while reimbursing exporters for 
their export tax from the central budget. This must impinge on the ver-
tical fiscal balance of the Chinese tax system however. To the extent that 
China's trade balance experiences fluctuations (if it swings from surplus 
into deficit and vice versa), such oscillations are reflected in the central 
government's budget and in a dynamically unstable vertical fiscal bal-
ance. Moreover, the Chinese VAT sharing system does not correct for the 
fact that typical investing provinces collect less revenue in relative terms 
(through the tax credit to investors) than consuming provinces. This also 
implies a bias against industrial regions with heavy investment require-
ments, as it favors provinces that supply chiefly the less capital-intensive 
services. 
Germany avoids such consequences by distributing its VAT mainly ac-
cording to population--which entails a significant redistribution effect in 
favor of poorer regions. Another portion of VAT is used for explicit 
asymmetrical vertical general revenue grants to be given to the poorest 
regions by the central government. Over the medium term, it might well 
                                       
35  For a more detailed discussion of such indicators see, again, Spahn, P. B., "Local 
Taxation: Principles and Scope" in this volume. 
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be appropriate for China to consider some implicit equalization mecha-
nism for the first-round tax distribution of VAT. At least one part of VAT 
could be distributed according to population (or some other indicator of 
fiscal need) while the remainder may continue to be distributed on the 
basis of local yield. Population figures could also be weighted in order to 
account for agglomeration effects when relating the big cities to rural 
areas. This might imply a two-stage distribution formula where one part 
of VAT goes to the region as such, and another part--with or without 
pass-down obligations--to municipalities. 
4.6 The grants system 
The grants system should in principle be neutral as to the decisions of 
lower level government. The accountability and responsiveness of prov-
inces to regional demand patterns should ideally be unaffected by the 
financial system. This is, of course, not fully realistic especially in a uni-
tary country like China where the national government pursues its policy 
goals that must also affect provincial budgets and decision-making. 
Nevertheless, the general neutrality rule has a significant bearing even 
within unitary government. It implies, notably, the following recommen-
dations: 
• Gap-filling grants should be avoided under almost all circumstances. 
The unconstrained or negotiated coverage of budget costs, typical for 
the previous Chinese system of intergovernmental fiscal relations, en-
courages inefficient spending at lower levels of government. It is thus 
wasteful in economic terms. Moreover, it is non-transparent and it is 
likely to exhibit regional inequities. Grant money is typically flows to 
the politically strong provinces, not where it is most efficient or most 
needed. The only rationale for gap-filling or cost -coverage grants 
exists for financing functions that are mandated to lower tiers of gov-
ernment. In these cases the province provides the national service on 
behalf of the central government (which may be warranted on admin-
istrative grounds). It is essential however that the central government 
is able to control the level of spending in these cases (e.g. welfare 
payments through national legislation). 
• Grants to the provinces should in principle be unconditional. They 
should be employable at the discretion of the provinces, which 
strengthens their expenditure responsibilities and accountability, and 
renders them flexible to respond to local demand for public services. 
Specific-purpose payments (SPPs) as an alternative to unconditional 
grants often fail to achieve their respective goals. If SPPs are given for 
a specific service that would have been supplied by the province any-
way, the SPP is tantamount to an unconditional grant since it frees 
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general resources of the budget. If the SPP is given for a service that 
would not be supplied otherwise, it may fail to meet the pattern of re-
gional demand, and spending would then be wasteful. Moreover, 
spending is different from output. Provincial governments may find 
ways to spend the SPP and still fail to meet a given output goal. This is 
why general revenue is preferable to SPPs, as provincial budgets re-
main responsive to local demand.  
• For a reduced number of issues SPPs seem to be in order however. 
This is true whenever strategic behavior of provinces can be excluded-
-like for disaster relief where the grant is given in response to events 
outside the control of government. It is also useful employing Sops 
whenever the central government aims at realizing policy goals with 
qualitative elements that are not directly related to spending as such. 
For instance, Sops could be conditioned on the adoption of national 
quality standards in the provision of health care or education. In these 
cases, Sops become the vehicle for realizing qualitative policy objec-
tives. Sops then become a "bribe" where the spending decision 
(whether it uses the grant or unconditional revenue) of the province is 
secondary.  
• As mentioned before, it is doubtful whether SPPs can impose central 
priorities onto provinces--unless spending is confused with output. 
However, SPPs may still be in the interest of the central government if 
it wants to demonstrate the political will to support a specific service 
even if the province would supply it anyway. This is the political "sig-
nal function" of SPPs, an entirely respectable policy goal. Such type of 
SPPs is employed in the case of politically sensitive issues (like minori-
ties) where the central government must have an interest to "signal" 
policy objectives. However, there is an inherent tendency to proliferate 
that type of grant. The number of signalizing SPPs should thus be re-
stricted, and periodically be consolidated into unconditional "bloc 
grants" in order to clear the "jungle" of intergovernmental subsidies. 
• If SPPs are provided, care must be taken in analyzing their potential 
disincentive effects. Not all politically sensitive issues do warrant SPPs. 
Unemployment, for instance, is undoubtedly a sensitive issue, yet it 
should not lead to corresponding SPPs. This is because such grants 
could be interpreted as implicit insurance, which would encourage 
strategic behavior of provinces. This is because insurance contracts 
suffer from a series of defects, which may bear on intergovernmental 
fiscal relations as well. One such deficiency is related to "moral haz-
ard" whereby a change in behavior is induced by the very nature of the 
insurance contract. At the level of intergovernmental finance this 
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might lead to self-inflicted shocks (for instance, surrender to unreal-
istic wage claims), or excessive consumption by provinces. Another 
problem is "adverse selection" which may tend to divide China into 
groups of provinces with different "risks". Automatic compensation 
could also encourage political inactivity in the area of structural ad-
justment policies. Criteria like regional employment should thus be 
excluded from determining the level of grants--because of their po-
tential negative incentive effects. If a national unemployment insur-
ance scheme operates at the personal level--for the unemployed--the 
implicit regional redistribution effects should be wholly sufficient. 
4.7 Horizontal equalization 
Second-round adjustments to the primary distribution of government 
revenue are typically concerned with equalization. Equalization arrange-
ments can take very different forms and they can be conducted out of a 
situation of vertical fiscal balance (as in Switzerland and Germany) or of 
imbalance (as in Australia). In the first case, a horizontal distribution 
formula may be used (Germany); in the latter case, the states have to 
agree on a vertically asymmetrical grants scheme with the central gov-
ernment. Obviously, the states are politically much stronger in the first 
case while they might be somewhat at the mercy of the central govern-
ment in the latter.  
It was mentioned before that China is unlikely to adopt a horizontal 
equalization scheme as in Germany. Thus the following relates to a 
scheme of asymmetrical vertical equalization grants from the central 
government to the provinces for which actual tax assignment and tax 
sharing seem to exhibit a sufficiently large scope. 
Equalization should be based on a formula that is general and transpar-
ent. The formula should provide general revenue as in Australia, and it 
must be independent of strategic behavior at the provincial level. This 
requires some form of revenue and/or outlay standardization, and it ex-
cludes, of course, negotiated elements of the grant system. The formula 
should also be based on hard statistical data that cannot be controlled 
by provincial governments and are available at the same quality level for 
all provinces. 
More generally, equalization schemes of all nations have to deal with horizontal redis-
tribution in order to equalize (i) standard own taxable capacity; (ii) standard expendi-
ture needs; and (iii) effects of population density and agglomeration on local expendi-
ture needs.36 Some countries have formally adopted this approach by equalizing the 
                                       
36  Cost differentials for supplying specific public services could also give rise to 
equalization provisions (as in Australia). Such differentials are however of minor impor-
Spahn, Paul Bernd (1995), ”China’s Reform of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in the Light 
of European Experiences”, in Jayanta Roy (ed.), Macroeconomic Management and Fiscal 
Decentralization, EDI Seminar Series, The World Bank, Washington D.C., 125-162.  
45 
difference between standard own fiscal capacity and expenditure needs, correcting it by 
factors that account for density and agglomeration effects (Germany). Others, like Aus-
tralia, attempt to incorporate population density and agglomeration into the definition 
of needs.37  
Both European federations discussed emphasize revenue equalization. 
Revenue has to be standardized in order to define the fiscal capacity of 
each region. This standard must be independent from provincial policy 
in order to avoid strategic behavior. If provinces are allowed to vary tax 
rates of their taxes, a standard (average) rate should be used. If they 
prefer not to exploit a tax source which is assigned to them, potential 
revenue from that source should be added into the capacity yardstick 
whether collected or not. Once standard revenue capacity is defined for 
all provinces, the variations from average standard capacity can be 
equalized to a predetermined degree. Revenue capacity equalization by 
itself is a very powerful tool although it can be argued that it fails to ac-
count for differences in needs and agglomeration. 
As demonstrated in the paper, Germany and Switzerland make some 
standard corrections to the fiscal capacity yardstick by including needs 
and agglomeration criteria in a condensed fashion. Needs and cost dif-
ferentials are taken care of by simple weighting procedures (for popula-
tion density, for farmland of a certain geographical altitude, etc.) rather 
than by effective statistical sampling methods. Some lump-sum adjust-
ments for different levels and composition of outlays are also effected 
for city states (agglomerations). However no attempt is made to stan-
dardize regional budgets explicitly--item by item--as in Australia. The 
simpler European approach can be regarded as a proxy to achieving the 
                                       
tance in a fully integrated market economy. This is true even for Australia (except for 
the Northern Territory with its sparse population). Where they are important they could 
be dealt with specifically and not within the generalized formula since the information 
requirements would be high. It is also not easy to standardize costs. If a formula fails 
to standardize costs, however, this must encourage inefficient spending and should be 
considered with great care.   
37  The distinction made between effects (ii) and (iii) is, of course, artificial. It is how-
ever warranted on grounds that agglomeration does not only affect the level of public 
services, but also the composition of the "basket" of public services. For instance, a 
smaller town may not need a subway system while a metropolitan area will. Agglom-
eration effects are also more important at the level of municipalities and are somewhat 
"evened out" at the provincial level. However, China has important "city provinces" like 
Shanghai and Beijing that need special considerations. A two-stage approach to re-
gional equalization may thus be commendable as in Germany where the formula distin-
guishes between the state and the local level of government with according pondera-
tions for population size and density. For a specific discussion of the German formula 
see Spahn (1994). 
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more ambitious goal of full budget equalization. It is viable as long as all 
participating governments politically accept it.   
To the question whether equalization requires the standardization of 
budgets (as in Australia), the answer of a European scholars of federal-
ism would thus be negative. Although the Australian approach seems to 
offer a "scientific formula" which must appeal to those in search of an 
objective basis for equalization, the approach is not without risks for 
China. These are mainly related to the immense information require-
ments for budget standardization. It is doubtful whether China will be in 
a position--at least in the short run--to supply all the data needed for 
all provinces at the same level of quality. Even a simpler set of parame-
ters bears risks, as statistical criteria tend to proliferate over time when 
selfish political pressure is exerted to "look into more detail".  
It is also questionable whether Australia has indeed found the objective 
magic formula for equalization--even for herself. The approach remains 
essentially political as to key elements (like the share to be distributed 
and the degree of equalization) and many parameters must be based on 
"informed insights" which are judgmental. It must be stressed that 
equalization is essentially a political undertaking and that distributional 
questions cannot escape value judgments. Moreover, the Australian 
grants formula is used for distributing unconditional general revenue. It 
is doubtful whether such formula should indeed be so explicit as to 
specify different needs of providing crocodile or shark protection for in-
stance. This means overstressing the exactitude of distributional justice, 
which is likely obtained at much lower costs with a similar degree of "ac-
curacy".  
Whatever the equalization arrangements are, they must be based on firm 
statistical criteria. Too complicated formulae are likely to blur the politi-
cal issues; they may meet statistical difficulties, and involve complicated 
conceptual measurement problems to which there is no conclusive an-
swer.  
In the end, equalization is a matter of value judgments and political 
compromise. Europeans would prefer simple formulae that serve as 
proxies to the equalization problem. In practice, these simple methods 
have reached a high degree of equalization and are deemed to be largely 
successful in achieving their policy goals. The quest for a scientific for-
mula of Chinese intergovernmental fiscal relations is probably mainly the 
quest for a stable, transparent, and objective transfer system that is 
based on independent statistical information for all provinces. If this is 
the case, a less ambitious equalization project is preferable to one that 
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requires full budget standardization. The simpler the formula the higher 
will be its transparency and political message. 
The formula should, however, stress the fact that what is gained by one 
province, has to be borne by other region(s), in other words, the shared 
pool or the equalization means should be closed-ended and distribution 
is a fixed-sum game. This by itself assures that the mechanism is 
deemed to be equitable by all participants.  
4.8 Capital expenditures 
Capital expenditures might remain somewhat outside the normal ar-
rangements for various reasons. In particular, their financing may be tied 
to borrowing, and only indirectly to taxation. If regional governments are 
allowed to borrow (as in Switzerland and Germany), there must be policy 
coordination of borrowing at the national level in order to avoid capital 
markets disturbances. If lower levels of government are not allowed to 
borrow, as in China, their capital expenditures must be borne mainly by 
the central government through capital grants.38 
European arrangements prefer tied (or conditional) grants for dealing 
with public investments at lower levels of government. Typically, grants 
by the central government have to be matched with own resources at the 
lower level. This is in order to unveil local preferences more clearly, and 
to enhance accountability.39 This idea is firmly entrenched in the Swiss 
and the German arrangements, and it is also found at the level of the 
Union. 
Germany (and to some extent Switzerland) goes, however, beyond the 
idea of matching grants. The regions and the central government take 
decisions of regional public investment projects jointly. This is in view of 
the bulky nature of some investment projects. It also avoids patronage of 
some regions and a fair ordering of projects through time given the limi-
tation of resources at all levels of government. Germany has created 
various task-oriented institutions for coordinating intergovernmental 
decision-making relating to infrastructural investments. A more formal 
joint-decision making machinery for provincial infrastructural invest-
                                       
38  Unfortunately, this conclusion is blurred by the fact that Chinese local govern-
ments and provinces often act as entrepreneurs through their holding of state enter-
prises. State firms can, of course, borrow which gives regional governments access to 
capital markets indirectly as budgets are not strictly separated. 
39  The idea of accountability is also blurred by "entrepreneurial government" (see 
Spahn 1994 in this volume). 
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ment and regional economic development may also be an option to be 
considered in China.  
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